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The Effects of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement on Africa's Regional 
Economic Communities: An Empirical Analysis 
Abstract 
This study examines the economic effects of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) on 
three regional economic communities in Africa: COMESA, ECOWAS, and CEMAC. It scrutinizes the effects 
of the agreement on Africa’s largest trading partners: the EU, China, and America. Three scenarios are 
modelled using the GTAP CGE model: a removal of tariffs on 97% of goods, a removal of non-tariff 
barriers, and a combination of the previous two scenarios. The findings show that the welfare of all 
African regions increases due to AfCFTA, but to varying degrees, with CEMAC benefiting the least of the 
three regional blocs. 
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 1. Introduction 
The African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), which came 
into force in May of 2019, is currently the world’s largest free trade zone (based 
on number of countries) since the founding of the World Trade Organization in 
1995. As of writing, 54 out of 55 African countries have signed the agreement, 
with the only non-signatory being Eritrea. The free trade area comprises 1.3 
billion people, encompassing a $3.4 trillion economic bloc. As part of the 
agreement, trade will be gradually liberalized through the removal of tariffs on 
most goods across Africa. In addition, AfCFTA seeks to progressively eliminate 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs) which play a significant role in hindering intra-African 
trade. Intra-African trade remains low despite steady increases in recent decades; 
intra-African exports make up 19% of total African exports, in contrast to 69% for 
intra-Europe trade. Furthermore, AfCFTA is predicted to massively boost trade in 
Africa by 15% to 25% in the medium term (UNECA, 2018). This value could 
double if NTBs are reduced as part of the agreement. Later in this study, NTBs 
are discussed more extensively, but they include regulatory and physical barriers 
such as poor road and rail links, excessive sanitary regulations, and corruption and 
civil unrest. This study focuses on sanitary and phytosanitary barriers (SPS) and 
technical barriers to trade (TBT), which are the most prevalent barriers hindering 
intra-African trade. The implementation of AfCFTA promises to create economic 
benefits for some African regions at the expense of others.  
 This study examines the economic impact of AfCFTA on three prominent 
regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa: the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), and the Economic and Monetary Community of 
Central Africa (CEMAC). The economic effects on Africa’s largest trading 
partners are also examined: the European Union, China, and the US. This study 
uses the GTAP computable general equilibrium model to simulate three scenarios 
under AfCFTA: first, the removal of tariffs on 97% of goods; second, the 
elimination of NTBs; and lastly, the removal of tariffs on 97% of goods and the 
elimination of NTBs.  
 The originality of this paper can be attributed to: new methodological 
findings on how to model NTBs in GTAP, a unique aggregation of African 
countries based on existing regional blocs, and the modelling of the best case 
scenario of a complete elimination of NTBs rather than a partial reduction. 
Additionally, the results are obtained using the GTAP 9 database. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is a review 
of related literature and studies pertaining to AfCFTA. Section 3 explains how the 
GTAP general equilibrium model is used as a quantitative framework. Section 4 
provides contextual background on existing tariff and non-tariff barriers in the 
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 regions under consideration. The results of this study under all three scenarios are 
analyzed in Section 5.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Most economic studies project that AfCFTA will yield vast 
macroeconomic benefits across Africa. Abrego, Amado, Gursoy, Nicholls, and 
Perez-Saiz (2019) estimate welfare gains based on a computable general 
equilibrium simulation (CGE) of a complete removal of intra-African tariffs and a 
35% reduction in NTBs, modelled as ad valorem tariff equivalents. Their findings 
show that a removal of tariffs increased welfare in Africa by only 0.05%, while 
reducing NTBs increased welfare across the continent by 1.7%. Furthermore, all 
African countries experienced an increase in welfare as a result of the agreement, 
with nine countries reaping gains of 5% or more. UNECA (2018) models 
AfCFTA using the MIRAGE CGE model through a double qualification 
approach, where a minimum proportion of total tariff lines, representing no less 
than the same proportion of total imports, is liberalized. They conclude from its 
results that AfCFTA “will be a game changer for stimulating intra-African trade”; 
they project an increase in intra-African trade between 15% ($50 billion) and 25% 
($70 billion). Their findings show that the overall GDP of the continent increases 
by only 1%, which can be explained by 83% of African exports directed towards 
foreign countries. Their model finds the increase in trade to be most pronounced 
in industrial sectors, increasing by 25% to 30%, with the agricultural sector 
bearing the second largest trade impact. The sectors of textiles, apparel, leather, 
wood products and paper, machinery and metals benefitted the most from 
AfCFTA. 
 As well, Kebe (2019) projects that economic growth resulting from 
AfCFTA is likely to attract more foreign direct investment along with intra-
continental investment. The creation of a single market allows countries to 
negotiate prices and production levels, enhancing the continent’s appeal as a 
global economic partner. The agreement is projected to foster the growth of more 
productive and skill-intensive industries, creating higher-paying jobs. In the long 
run, AfCFTA allows the continent to move towards its goal of being self-
sustaining.  
On the other hand, Fofack (2018) indicates the challenges in successfully 
liberalizing intra-African trade, including institutional resistance and the large 
costs of infrastructure development needed to boost trade. Among other studies, 
he observes the large role of NTBs in hindering trade between African countries 
as of today, specifically border delays, multiple licensing requirements, and 
intensive sanitary inspections and regulations. Other challenges hindering intra-
African trade include corrupt governance, supply-side constraints, and an 
inherited colonial model of depending on resource extraction. Another 
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 inconvenience lies in the overlap between many regional economic communities 
(RECs) in Africa, presenting an unwelcoming and bureaucratic business 
environment. The implementation of AfCFTA works towards gradually topple 
these barriers, and if successful, can contribute to a significant rise in Africa’s 
ranking on the Global Competitiveness Index. 
To add to these complications, Bello and Gass (2018) point out that 
tremendous income disparities across African countries could problematize 
continental integration, making it hard to bring win-win outcomes for all countries 
involved. While Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa combine to account for over 
50% of Africa’s GDP, the six sovereign island nations of Africa together account 
for only 1%. Diversified economies such as Ethiopia and Cote d’Ivoire are 
projected to benefit the most from AfCFTA in the short term, while economies 
with large manufacturing bases such as South Africa and Kenya are able to export 
to more destinations. On the other hand, resource-dependent economies such as 
Chad and the Republic of Congo risk being outcompeted by more diverse, 
technologically advanced economies.  
 
3. Model Design 
This paper uses the GTAP model to simulate the economic effects of a 
97% removal in tariffs across goods and a complete removal of NTBs hindering 
intra-African trade. It examines the effects on different regional blocs in Africa 
(COMESA, ECOWAS, CEMAC) and its largest exporters (EU, China, US). The 
standard GTAP model is a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model with 
multiple regions and multiple sectors. The database used for modelling the trade 
agreement in this paper is GTAP 9 (2011). The following paragraphs discuss how 
the GTAP framework is applied to modelling AfCFTA. 
 
3.1. The Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model 
 A CGE model is a simplified economy that represents economic 
relationships between different economic agents in mathematical terms. Provided 
with data about technologies, policies and customer preferences, it is able to 
forecast changes in a wide array of economic variables such as prices, outputs, 
and welfare. The model accomplishes this by seeking a new equilibrium at which 
supply equals demand in every market. The benefit of using a CGE model to 
simulate policies is it brings a consistent model of the economy; for example, 
ensuring that all consumption is covered by production or imports. Perhaps more 
importantly, CGE modelling provides the opportunity to capture a large range of 
data that is impossible to observe through only using econometric estimations. 
The limitations of using a CGE model involve a reliance on assumptions about the 
economy, meaning it is not perfectly realistic. 
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 3.2. The GTAP Framework  
 The GTAP CGE model uses input-output tables as its database. GTAP is a 
multi-sector, multi-region computable general equilibrium framework. The model 
assumes perfect competition in agricultural sectors and imperfect competition in 
manufacturing and service sectors, while also assuming constant returns to scale. 
By capturing the interactions of diverse markets and sectors under both a regional 
and international context, it can predict how an economy reacts under policy 
changes or external shocks. Policy scenarios are compared to an initial 
equilibrium where AfCFTA has not yet been implemented. 
 
3.3. Aggregations and Variables 
 The geographic aggregation consists of three main regional economic 
communities (RECs) in Africa, and Africa’s largest trading partners. The RECs 
chosen for this study are COMESA, ECOWAS, and CEMAC, as previously 
mentioned. This accounts for a wide geographic survey of Africa, and from this, 
the study can examine how different geographic regions are disparately affected 
by AfCFTA. Additionally, members within each regional bloc share similar tariff 
rates internally, and often externally in the case of a customs union. Thus, it is 
easier to make generalizations across members of the same regional bloc given 
that tariffs will be reduced to a similar degree. Other regions that are aggregated 
separately are Africa’s primary trading partners: the European Union (EU), China, 
and the US. All other countries fall into the Rest of the World (ROW) category. 
 The GTAP aggregation of the sectors was based primarily on a table by 
Cabot et al. (2015) showing the ad valorem tariff equivalents of non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs), which are  introduced in Section 4.3. This was done to model a more 
accurate removal of NTBs by grouping sectors based on the table. For the sake of 
simplicity, some sectors presented in the table were grouped together with logical 
consideration. When analyzing the results of the experiment, the crops and 
animals sectors fall under the agricultural industry, while the plastics and 
chemicals, wood products and paper, textiles and clothing, and machinery and 
metals sectors are considered components of the manufacturing industry. Since 
the manufacturing and agricultural industries are projected to benefit the most 
from AfCFTA, the chosen aggregation focuses on breaking down and examining 
these areas of growth. 
 
4. Descriptive Statistics 
4.1. Existing Tariffs 
Before examining the economic impacts of AfCFTA, it is important to 
understand the current economic situation of the continent, and Africa’s 
relationship with its main trading partners. Tables 1a, 1b, and 1c display existing 
tariff structures (as ad valorem rates) on imports into COMESA, ECOWAS, and 
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 CEMAC. The imports are from each regional bloc and the Rest of Africa 
(countries not part of the regional blocs under consideration), in addition to 
Africa’s main trading partners: the EU, China, America, and the Rest of the 
World. To clarify, imports from a regional bloc into the same regional bloc 
represent tariffs on trade within the bloc; for example, the data from COMESA to 
COMESA shows the aggregate tariff rate between member countries. Given that 
COMESA, ECOWAS, and CEMAC are regional trade blocs, tariffs between 
countries that are part of the same regional bloc tend to be low. For example, 
tariffs between the member countries of CEMAC are close to 0 for all sectors, as 
shown in Table 1c. However, some of these regional economic communities 
(RECs) have failed to fully liberalize trade, which can be attributed to factors that 
include a lack of clear political consensus by member countries, a reliance on 
import tariffs as a source of government revenue, and cumbersome trade 
regulations (Khandelwal, 2004). Tariffs on trade within ECOWAS are especially 
high, venturing into 2-digit values, as shown in Table 1b. Tariffs between the 
three regional blocs are high. Of the three regional blocs, CEMAC has the highest 
tariffs imposed on imports from other regions, with tariff rates as high as 27% on 
imports from COMESA and 29% on imports from ECOWAS. Conversely, 
COMESA and ECOWAS have smaller tariffs on imports from CEMAC in some 
sectors, such as the mining and machinery sectors. This indicates that when tariffs 
are removed under the agreement, CEMAC is likely to benefit the least. 
 
Table 1a. Tariffs on imports from Region X into COMESA 
rTMS 
1 
COMESA 
2 
ECOWAS 
3 
CEMAC 
4 Rest of 
Africa 5 EU 
6 
China 7 US 
 8 Rest 
of World 
1 Animals 1.78 32.3 19.1 17 9.07 28 4.62 8.22 
2 Crops 1.3 3.61 13.8 17.2 27.7 23.1 3.92 6.65 
3 Beverages and 
Tobacco 1.91 6.69 12.4 27.9 222 36.4 705 116 
4 Mining 1.85 2.83 0.017 4.61 5.59 12.6 4.99 2.46 
5 Plastics and 
Chemicals 1.95 7.53 0.274 5.54 18.1 9.86 4.55 15.4 
6Wood Products  1.11 5.38 10 8.25 7.64 18.1 8.66 7.75 
7 Textiles and 
Clothing 2.68 15.5 29.4 20.8 11 20.1 12.4 11.3 
8 Machinery and 
Metals 0.876 7.69 0.768 6.22 7.15 9.89 11.6 9.23 
9 Miscellaneous 0.773 0.935 0.42 2.45 0.626 6.3 0.434 0.834 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
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Table 1b. Tariffs on imports from Region X into ECOWAS 
rTMS 
1 
COMESA 
2 
ECOWAS 
3 
CEMAC 
4 Rest 
of Africa 
5 
EU 
6 
China 7 US 
8 Rest 
of World 
1 Animals 9.21 14.8 11.2 14.5 12.6 17.2 10.9 11.1 
2 Crops 13.3 10.9 14.8 13.7 10.6 13.9 6.18 14.6 
3 Beverages and 
Tobacco 16.6 16.2 15.2 20.2 19.2 18.1 12.8 17.3 
4 Mining 8.92 4.15 5.59 8.69 7.79 12.3 9.95 8.5 
5 PlsChm 9.14 10.8 9.3 7.38 7.35 9.3 10.3 8.14 
6 Wood Products 14.2 9.87 11.1 11.2 10.9 15 6.49 9.6 
7 Textiles and 
Clothing 14.5 16 12.2 16.1 16.8 17.4 14.4 15.9 
8 Machinery and 
Metals 9.64 10.8 5.75 9.1 8.89 11.3 10 10.6 
9 Miscellaneous 0.093 8.62 0.109 1.09 1.07 10.5 0.422 0.655 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
Table 1c. Tariffs on imports from region X into CEMAC 
rTMS 
1 
COMESA 
2 
ECOWAS 
3 
CEMAC 
4 Rest 
of Africa 
5 
EU 
6 
China 7 US 
8 Rest 
of World 
1 Animals 26.2 29 0 23.7 13.8 29.6 7.61 12.7 
2 Crops 23.7 7.18 0.005 22.6 13.7 19.9 13.2 13.5 
3 Beverages and 
Tobacco 26 25.1 0 29.3 22.6 25.4 28.6 18.9 
4 Mining 19.5 10.2 0 11.5 13.8 21.7 10.8 10.7 
5 Plastic and 
Chemicals 12.7 18.8 0 15.1 11.1 14.1 13.1 10.6 
6 Wood Products 27.4 14 0 17.8 20 26.8 15.4 18.4 
7 Textiles and 
Clothing 24.5 19.4 0 26.6 26.4 26.2 22.4 23.9 
8 Machinery and 
Metals 15.9 15.9 0.01 13.9 13.7 15.5 13 15.6 
9 Miscellaneous 4.43 6.01 0 4.62 1.47 6.18 0.331 0.443 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
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 4.2. Modified Tariffs 
This study examines the economic implications of implementing three 
separate scenarios in GTAP: a removal of tariffs in 97% of sectors, a complete 
removal of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), and a removal of 97% of tariffs combined 
with a complete removal of NTBs.  
AfCFTA requires a complete liberalization of 90% of goods over the 
course of 5 to 8 years, with an elimination of tariffs on 7% of goods classified as 
“sensitive” over 10 to 13 years, leaving 3% of goods to be exempt from tariff 
liberalization (Matheson, 2019). For the sake of simplicity, this study has 
designated the 3% “exempt goods” to be the textiles and clothing sector, which 
comprises 3.5% of all 57 goods modelled in GTAP. This industry was chosen 
given that it was subject to the highest tariff rates imposed by the regional blocs 
under consideration, according to GTAP data. Given this, it can be reasonably 
assumed that many African countries highly value protecting domestic textiles 
and clothing industries from outside competition, making this industry the most 
likely to be exempt from tariff liberalization. The agreement also stipulates an 
anti-concentration clause, which ensures that no greater than 10% of the value of 
recent imports from AfCFTA countries can be claimed to be exempt from tariffs. 
Bearing this in mind, aggregate imports from the textile industry do not make up 
over 10% of the value of imports, as verified by the GTAP dataset. The 7% of 
“sensitive goods” to be gradually liberalized is grouped together with the 90% of 
goods to be liberalized sooner, thus this study models a removal of tariffs on 97% 
of goods. Tables 2a, 2b, 2c and 2d show that tariff rates are close to zero for all 
sectors and regions with the exception of textiles and clothing, being exempt 
goods. The 3.47% on animal imports from ECOWAS into COMESA can be 
attributed to a glitch in the GTAP software, but should not significantly impact 
results. 
 
Table 2a. Modified Tariffs on imports from region X into COMESA under 
AfCFTA 
 1 COMESA 2 ECOWAS 3 CEMAC 4 Rest of Africa 
1 Animals 0 3.47 0.012 0.003 
2 Crops 0 0 0 0 
3 Beverages and Tobacco 0 0 0 0 
4 Mining 0 0 0 0 
5 Plastics and Chemicals 0 0 0 0 
6 Wood Products 0 0.001 0 0 
7 Textiles and Clothing 2.68 15.5 29.4 20.8 
7
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 8 Machinery and Metals 0 0 0 0 
9 Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0 
Total 2.68 18.9 29.4 20.8 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
Table 2b. Modified Tariffs on imports from region X into ECOWAS under 
AfCFTA 
 1 COMESA 2 ECOWAS 3 CEMAC 4 Rest of Africa 
1 Animals 0 0.002 0.001 0.002 
2 Crops 0 0 0 0 
3 Beverages and Tobacco 0 0 0 0 
4 Mining 0 0 0 0 
5 Plastics and Chemicals 0 0 0 0 
6 Wood Products 0.001 0 0 0 
7 Textiles and Clothing 14.5 16 12.2 16.1 
8 Machinery and Metals 0 0 0 0 
9 Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0 
Total 14.5 16 12.2 16.1 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
Table 2c. Modified Tariffs on imports from region X into CEMAC under 
AfCFTA 
 1 COMESA 2 ECOWAS 3 CEMAC 4 Rest of Africa 
1 Animals 0.027 0.048 0 0.01 
2 Crops 0.001 0 0 0 
3 Beverages and Tobacco 0 0 0 0 
4 Mining 0.006 -0.019 0 0.021 
5 Plastics and Chemicals 0 0.001 0 0 
6 Wood Products 0.015 0.001 0 0 
7 Textiles and Clothing 24.5 19.4 0 26.6 
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 8 Machinery and Metals 0.001 0.001 0 0 
9 Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0 
Total 24.6 19.4 0 26.6 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
Table 2d. Modified Tariffs on imports from region X into the Rest of Africa 
under AfCFTA 
 1 COMESA 2 ECOWAS 3 CEMAC 4 RestofAfrica 
1 Animals 0 0.001 0.001 0 
2 Crops 0 0 0.001 0 
3 Beverages and Tobacco 0 0 0 0 
4 Mining 0 0 0 0 
5 Plastics and Chemicals 0 0 0 0 
6 Wood Products 0 0 0 0 
7 Textiles and Clothing 1.26 8.97 21.4 4.84 
8 Machinery and Metals 0 0 0 0.001 
9 Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0 
Total 1.26 8.98 21.4 4.84 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
4.3. Non-tariff Barriers in Intra-African Trade 
 Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are widespread in Africa, and play a significant 
role in hampering intra-continental trade. Abrego et al. (2019) find that technical 
barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary/phytosanitary measures (SPS) are the most 
prevalent NTBs in Africa by a wide margin. Gaps in infrastructure and 
transportation costs also hinder the efficiency of trade. Although some of these 
barriers are necessary, they are often used to distort trade in favour of 
protectionism or are unnecessarily bureaucratic and cumbersome. RECs such as 
COMESA, ECOWAS, and CEMAC have done little to address NTBs. This is 
likely a result of a combination of factors which include: an inability to reconcile 
the commitments of dual member states, a lack of transparency and access to 
information, and/or a lack of trust between African nations concerning the quality 
of imported goods (Viljoen, 2018).  
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 Simulating the removal of these NTBs proved to be a challenge; in this 
respect, this study hopes to bring forward another method of modelling the 
removal of NTBs. The conventional way to model the removal of NTBs is to use 
the tariff ad valorem equivalents (AVE) of NTBs as theorized by previous studies. 
However, this would not be possible as this study plans on modelling both a 97% 
removal of tariffs on goods on top of an elimination of NTBs, as a third scenario 
of AfCFTA. Given that tariff rates for 97% of goods would already be set to zero, 
a further deduction in tariffs to simulate the removal of NTBs would be 
impossible. The other way to model the removal of NTBs is through a 
productivity shock, or a shock to the GTAP variable ams, citing Fugazza and 
Maur (2006). Given the limited nature of studies done on modelling a productivity 
shock, it is unclear how much the variable ams should be shocked to model the 
respective levels of NTBs. Provided with these limitations, this study models the 
removal of NTBs through deriving ams values that correspond to the AVE tariff 
equivalents in each sector. First, tariff rates between all regional blocs under 
consideration were increased by the AVE equivalents shown in Table 31. The 
percent change in import prices, as measured by the variable pim, was recorded. 
Given that the variables ams and pim are inversely proportional, an increase in 
pim entails a decrease in ams (productivity). By conducting various GTAP 
experiments, the corresponding ams values (negative) that yielded the same pim 
values were recorded, varying for each sector and region. Taking the positive 
version of the resulting ams values decreases pim by a similar proportion, 
mimicking a decrease in AVE tariff rates to simulate the removal of NTBs. 
In modelling the removal of NTBs under AfCFTA, this study focuses 
solely on the TBT and SPS barriers due to their prevalence in Africa. The 
percentages found in Table 3 are a combination of the ad valorem tariff 
equivalents of TBT and SPS barriers. This study models a complete elimination of 
NTBs, citing the consolidated treaty put forward by the African Union (2018) 
which calls for the “elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade and investment”. 
The derived ams percentage shocks for the second and third scenarios are 
shown in Tables 4a, 4b, 4c, and 4d for imports entering each respective region. 
This represents an increase in productivity, meaning that given the same amount 
of exports, the amount of imported product available to the region increases by x 
percent. The ams shock applied to imports of the same sector entering the same 
region (as separated by each table) are mostly the same, with slight fluctuations to 
adjust for the proper pim value (± 0.1). Since the ad valorem tariff equivalents are 
different from sector to sector, the ams shocks varied depending on the sector. 
 
1 In an ideal scenario, tariffs would be decreased. However, this would be impractical given that 
many existing tariffs cannot be reduced by the amounts in Table 2, for example, a 1% tariff cannot 
be reduced further than 1%. 
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 Most ams values fell between 7% to 14%, with the textiles and clothing industry 
being a notable outlier, with a range between 3% to 6%. 
 
 
Table 3. Ad Valorem Tariff Equivalents of NTBs in Africa 
 SPS + TBT (%) 
Animals 13.7 
Crops 16.9 
Beverages and Tobacco 17.2 
Mining 12.8 
Plastics and Chemicals 9.8 
Wood Products and Paper 10 
Textiles and Clothing 6.4 
Machinery and Metals 10 
Miscellaneous 12.6 
Source: Derived from Cabot et al. (2015)2 
 
The derived ams percentage shocks for the second and third scenarios are 
shown in Tables 4a, 4b, 4c, and 4d for imports entering each respective region. 
This represents an increase in productivity, meaning that given the same amount 
of exports, the amount of imported product available to the region increases by x 
percent. The ams shock applied to imports of the same sector entering the same 
region (as separated by each table) are mostly the same, with slight fluctuations to 
adjust for the proper pim value (± 0.1). Since the ad valorem tariff equivalents are 
different from sector to sector, the ams shocks varied depending on the sector. 
Most ams values fell between 7% to 14%, with the textiles and clothing industry 
being a notable outlier, with a range between 3% to 6%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Raw data can be found in another table published by Cabot et al. (2015). The data found in Table 
2 has been aggregated for the purposes of matching the GTAP sectors used in this model. For 
example, the chemicals sector was combined with the plastics sector, and the average AVE value 
was taken. 
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 Table 4a. Applied ams Shocks (%) on Imports from Region X to COMESA 
ams[**COMESA] COMESA ECOWAS CEMAC Rest of Africa 
1 Animals 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 
2 Crops 13.6 13.6 13.6 13.6 
3 Beverages and Tobacco 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2 
4 Mining 11 11.1 11 11.1 
5 Plastics and Chemicals 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 
6 Wood Products 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 
7 Textiles and Clothing 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 
8 Machinery and Metals 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 
9 Miscellaneous 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
Table 4b. Applied ams Shocks on Imports from Region X to ECOWAS 
ams[**ECOWAS] COMESA ECOWAS CEMAC Rest of Africa 
1 Animals 10.6 10.6 10.6 10.6 
2 Crops 13 13 13 13 
3 Beverages and Tobacco 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 
4 Mining 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 
5 Plastics and Chemicals 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 
6 Wood Products 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 
7 Textiles and Clothing 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 
8 Machinery and Metals 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 
9 Miscellaneous 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
Table 4c. Applied ams Shocks on Imports from Region X to CEMAC 
ams[**CEMAC] COMESA ECOWAS CEMAC Rest of Africa 
1 Animals 9.9 9.9 9.9 9.9 
2 Crops 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 
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 3 Beverages and Tobacco 12.1 12 12 12 
4 Mining 10.3 10.3 10.2 10.2 
5 Plastics and Chemicals 7.9 8 7.9 8 
6 Wood Products 7.8 7.8 7.7 7.8 
7 Textiles and Clothing 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 
8 Machinery and Metals 8 8 8 8 
9 Miscellaneous 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
Table 4d. Applied ams Shocks on Imports from Region X to the Rest of 
Africa 
ams[**RestofAfrica] COMESA ECOWAS CEMAC Rest of Africa 
1 Animals 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.6 
2 Crops 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 
3 Beverages and Tobacco 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3 
4 Mining 11.2 11.2 11.1 11 
5 Plastics and Chemicals 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 
6 Wood Products 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 
7 Textiles and Clothing 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 
8 Machinery and Metals 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 
9 Miscellaneous 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
4.3. Demand Side 
 Of the three regional blocs, ECOWAS has the largest GDP ($535.4 
billion), marginally larger than the GDP of COMESA ($465.9 billion), and 
dwarfing the GDP of CEMAC ($89 billion) which is approximately 5 times 
smaller than the other regional blocs, as displayed in Table 4. It is worth noting 
that COMESA members include the large economies of Egypt ($332.3 billion), 
Ethiopia ($87.3 billion), and Kenya ($86 billion). Similarly, Nigeria ($460.7 
billion) is a member of ECOWAS. The ratio of exports and imports to GDP 
(dependence on trade) in COMESA, ECOWAS, and CEMAC is 62.7%, 55.8%, 
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 and 75% respectively. These numbers illustrate a large dependence on trade in all 
three regional blocs studied, meaning a continental free trade agreement of 
AfCFTA’s scale has the potential to yield large-scale economic impacts. CEMAC 
is the only regional bloc with net exports exceeding imports, resulting in a higher 
trade balance than the other regional blocs. This can likely be explained by close-
to-zero tariffs on goods being imported by member countries, decreasing the 
value of imports while benefiting exporting countries.  
 
Table 4. Percent Expenditure 
 
1 
Consumption 
2 
Investment 
3 
Government 
4 
Exports 
5 
Imports 
Total GDP  
(USD 
Millions) 
1 COMESA 76.50 19.36 12.83 27.00 -35.70 465856 
2 ECOWAS 72.18 19.11 10.80 26.86 -28.97 535369 
3 CEMAC 42.00 32.87 10.21 44.98 -30.06 89027 
4 Rest of 
Africa 53.67 23.71 21.29 34.99 -33.66 986259 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
Current household domestic purchases, as shown in Table 5, indicate 
which sectors are most in-demand by households in each regional bloc. On 
average, crops are the highest domestically purchased sector, with animals being 
the second most in-demand; this can be attributed to Africa’s significant 
dependence on agriculture (McKinsey & Company, 2010). Total household 
purchases in COMESA and ECOWAS far exceed CEMAC because of its 
comparatively smaller size, with only 6 members and a smaller GDP. 
 
Table 5. Percent Household Domestic Purchases by Sector In Each Region 
(%) 
 1 COMESA 2 ECOWAS 3 CEMAC 4 Rest of Africa 
1 Animals 8.50 12.07 9.54 9.51 
2 Crops 22.69 52.29 25.63 15.28 
3 Beverages and Tobacco 4.97 1.75 4.66 6.43 
4 Mining 4.14 0.81 2.15 2.76 
5 Plastics and Chemicals 2.12 0.86 2.84 3.40 
6 Wood Products 2.49 0.76 0.97 1.32 
7 Textiles and Clothing 7.70 1.58 3.73 4.51 
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 8 Machinery and Metals 2.98 2.01 2.48 3.29 
9 Miscellaneous 44.41 27.86 48.01 53.50 
Total (Millions of USD) 320892 305491 27291 9.51 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
4.4. Supply Side 
Table 6 shows industry output arranged by sector and regional bloc. The 
crops sector has the highest industry output in COMESA and ECOWAS, while 
mining has the highest output in CEMAC, comprising 22.47% of total industry 
output. The regional bloc with the largest overall industry output is COMESA, 
which can be accounted for by its size and largest combined GDP, with 19 
members. The total industry output of COMESA and ECOWAS dwarf the total 
industry output of CEMAC, meaning they produce far more than the latter region. 
 
Table 6. Percent Industry Output By Sector (%) 
qo 1 COMESA 2 ECOWAS 3 CEMAC 4 Rest of Africa 
1 Animals 4.72 7.18 2.54 3.80 
2 Crops 15.17 26.97 7.72 6.08 
3 Beverages and Tobacco 2.50 0.89 1.11 1.74 
4 Mining 11.68 17.01 22.47 14.52 
5 Plastics and Chemicals 2.64 1.28 1.98 4.33 
6 Wood Products 2.00 0.93 2.512 2.25 
7 Textiles and Clothing 5.36 0.89 1.12 2.17 
8 Machinery and Metals 7.57 4.15 7.24 10.66 
9 Miscellaneous 48.36 40.70 53.31 54.43 
Total (Millions of USD) 892631 714016 156773 1996241 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
The output measured above is produced using a combination of five 
factors of production: land, unskilled labour, skilled labour, capital, and natural 
resources. Tables 7a, 7b and 7c show the percentages of the income generated by 
sector for each factor of production. This data is taken as a sum of incomes from 
each region under consideration; it is representative of Africa as a whole. Capital 
has the largest overall contribution to the economy, with major contributions in 
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 each sector. As of now, Africa faces widespread underinvestment in many 
industries; McKinsey & Company (2010) project that improving the agricultural 
industry in Sub-Saharan Africa alone requires annual investments of $50 billion. 
Unskilled labour and skilled labour also contribute greatly to income in all 
sectors, with unskilled labour being of particular value to the agricultural sector 
(animals and crops). Land and natural resources make up significantly smaller 
portions of total income due to only being significant in certain sectors. 
 
Table 7a. Percent Sources of Factor Income by Sector in COMESA (%) 
EVFA 
1 
Animals 
2 
Crops 
3 
Beverages, 
Tobacco 
4 
Mining 
5 Plastics, 
Chemicals 
6 Wood 
Products 
7 
Textiles, 
Clothing 
8 
Machinery, 
Metals 
9 
Misc 
Total 
(Millions of 
USD) 
1 Land 12.48 87.50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8075 
2 
Unskilled 
Labour 6.99 34.16 1.30 3.35 1.45 1.56 3.03 4.38 43.78 111365 
3 Skilled 
Labour 3.47 4.27 0.85 3.81 1.36 1.41 3.16 4.56 77.14 104819 
4 Capital 2.60 10.70 4.59 14.16 1.77 1.58 6.02 4.60 53.98 196106 
5 Natural 
Resources 0 0 0 87.54 0 0 0 0 12.46 15758 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
Table 7b. Percent Sources of Factor Income by Sector in ECOWAS (%) 
EVFA 
1 
Animals 
2 
Crops 
3 
Beverages, 
Tobacco 
4 
Mining 
5 Plastics, 
Chemicals 
6 Wood 
Products 
7 
Textiles, 
Clothing 
8 
Machinery, 
Metals 
9 
Misc 
Total 
(Millions 
of USD) 
1 Land 7.50 92.50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19423 
2 
Unskilled 
Labour 6.70 64.52 0.22 0.32 0.16 0.26 0.24 0.49 27.07 162961 
3 Skilled 
Labour 9.25 5.90 1.19 0.90 0.71 1.47 1.38 2.84 76.38 110185 
4 Capital 4.23 14.81 0.50 39.01 1.10 0.95 0.69 7.12 31.59 176417 
5 Natural 
Resources 0 0 0 92.28 0 0 0 0 7.72 31571 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
 
16
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 16 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 24
https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol16/iss1/24
 Table 7c. Percent Sources of Factor Income by Sector in CEMAC (%) 
 
EVFA 
1 
Animals 
2 
Crops 
3 
Beverages, 
Tobacco 
4 
Mining 
5 Plastics, 
Chemicals 
6 Wood 
Products 
7 
Textiles, 
Clothing 
8 
Machinery, 
Metals 
9 
Misc 
Total 
(Millions 
of USD) 
1 Land 17.31 82.82 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 774 
2 
Unskilled 
Labour 4.57 19.30 0.61 11.99 2.01 1.66 1.22 3.85 54.79 19461 
3 Skilled 
Labour 1.24 3.79 0.50 9.25 1.67 1.38 1.01 3.19 77.97 15615 
4 Capital 1.34 4.33 1.25 24.02 2.07 1.79 0.97 7.50 56.74 38472 
5 Natural 
Resources 0 0 0 94.67 0 0 0 0 5.31 7061 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
6. Results 
 
6.1. Removal of 97% Intra-African Tariffs on Goods 
 Tables 8a, 8b and 8c show the percent change in bilateral imports for 
each sector from Region X into the three respective regions (COMESA, 
ECOWAS, CEMAC), as well as reporting changes in import sales from non-
African countries. All regions increase import purchases the most in the animals 
sector, with COMESA importing 631.95% more livestock-related goods from 
ECOWAS. This can be explained by originally high tariffs on livestock between 
regions (refer to Tables 1a, 1b and 1c). Imports within CEMAC decrease across 
nearly all liberalized sectors, as shown in Table 8c. This is likely due to its low 
regional tariff rates prior to the agreement (refer to Table 1c), bordering 0% 
across most sectors, meaning it has little to gain in terms of intra-CEMAC trade 
from the agreement. Rather, CEMAC members are likely to trade more with 
COMESA and ECOWAS as once-high tariff rates are now liberalized, replacing 
trade between CEMAC members. CEMAC also imports far less from non-African 
countries, with decreases in imports averaging about -20% across all sectors. 
Since imports from other African countries are cheaper, there is a net shift away 
from foreign producers. Overall, CEMAC experiences the greatest net increases 
in import purchases. 
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 Table 8a. Percent Change in Bilateral Import Sales from Region X into 
COMESA (%) 
qxs COMESA ECOWAS CEMAC 
Rest of 
Africa EU China US 
Rest of 
World 
Animals 5.01 631.95 268.14 190.91 -7.02 -6.97 -6.97 -7 
Crops 2.23 11.42 86.44 101.11 -3.66 -3.63 -3.63 -3.64 
Beverages, 
Tobacco 0.32 10.71 27.59 66.9 -3.74 -3.73 -3.73 -3.74 
Mining 14.14 23.1 -1.59 43.33 -2.44 -2.36 -2.45 -2.48 
Plastics, 
Chemicals 10.22 54.92 1.65 33.5 -3.24 -3.21 -3.22 -3.26 
Wood Products 3.56 30.93 79.8 53.49 -3.4 -3.38 -3.38 -3.41 
Textiles, 
Clothing -0.66 -3.03 1.2 -4.08 0.51 0.56 0.55 0.51 
Machinery, 
Metals 3.53 66.27 5.43 47.53 -3.01 -2.99 -2.98 -3.03 
Misc 2.75 2.24 3.13 7.58 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.33 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
Table 8b. Percent Change in Bilateral Import Sales from Region X into 
ECOWAS (%) 
qxs COMESA ECOWAS CEMAC 
Rest of 
Africa EU China US 
Rest of 
World 
Animals 85.66 164.09 125.45 155.55 -4 -3.95 -3.95 -3.98 
Crops 80.12 58.49 98.65 76.74 -1.71 -1.68 -1.68 -1.69 
Beverages, 
Tobacco 35.41 33.33 33.58 43.07 -4.77 -4.75 -4.76 -4.77 
Mining 100.57 32.95 54.84 94.23 -6.25 -6.17 -6.26 -6.28 
Plastics, 
Chemicals 69.69 85.89 76.28 46.75 -5.01 -4.98 -4.99 -5.03 
Wood Products 120.44 68.08 88.53 79.19 -4.83 -4.81 -4.81 -4.85 
Textiles, 
Clothing -0.38 -2.61 1.56 -3.79 0.82 0.88 0.87 0.83 
Machinery, 
Metals 97.02 108.7 53.44 82.16 -2.38 -2.36 -2.34 -2.39 
Misc 0.28 39.96 2.25 2.16 0.79 0.8 0.81 0.78 
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 Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
Table 8c. Percent Change in Bilateral Import Sales from Region X into 
CEMAC (%) 
qxs COMESA ECOWAS CEMAC 
Rest of 
Africa EU China US 
Rest of 
World 
Animals 358.43 425.14 -18.87 276.83 -21.76 -21.72 -21.72 -21.74 
Crops 126.64 10.25 -16.78 109.92 -19.18 -19.15 -19.15 -19.16 
Beverages, 
Tobacco 52.38 48.89 -9.26 59.44 -10.26 -10.25 -10.25 -10.26 
Mining 215.2 49.79 -35.48 66.87 -36.22 -36.16 -36.23 -36.25 
Plastics, 
Chemicals 76.87 147.4 -17.42 96.42 -19.79 -19.77 -19.78 -19.81 
Wood 
Products 273.76 79.9 -17.61 118.95 -19.1 -19.08 -19.08 -19.11 
Textiles, 
Clothing -1.32 -3.57 0.52 -4.67 -0.17 -0.11 -0.12 -0.16 
Machinery, 
Metals 157.96 150.91 -14.5 115.63 -16.61 -16.6 -16.58 -16.63 
Misc 18.39 24.68 0.49 16.58 -0.48 -0.46 -0.46 -0.49 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
As shown in Tables 9a and 9b, a removal of 97% of tariffs results in a net 
commodity price decline in CEMAC, while the other regional blocs face price 
increases in nearly all sectors and factors of production. This is because, under a 
free trade scenario, CEMAC primarily imports goods from COMESA and 
ECOWAS rather than exports goods (refer to Table 10a). Tables 1a, 1b and 1c 
also support this hypothesis. CEMAC had originally imposed extremely high 
tariffs on COMESA and ECOWAS, meaning access to cheap imports was limited. 
Conversely, COMESA and ECOWAS originally had lower tariff rates on imports 
from CEMAC, meaning liberalization favours increasing the exports of the former 
two regions over the latter. Examining the agriculture sector, tariff liberalization 
drastically increases imports of agricultural products from COMESA and 
ECOWAS into CEMAC, as shown in Table 8c. Thus, the prices of animals and 
crops decrease in CEMAC while increasing in COMESA and ECOWAS due to 
greater demand for the exports of the latter two regions (refer to Table 9a). 
Similarly, the price of land decreases considerably in CEMAC while increasing in 
COMESA and ECOWAS due to greater demand for the production of land-
intensive agricultural products. 
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Table 9a. Market Price of Commodities (% change) 
pm COMESA ECOWAS CEMAC Rest of Africa 
Animals 0.17 0.59 -0.52 0.78 
Crops 0.06 0.57 -0.66 0.82 
Beverages and Tobacco 0.08 0.38 -0.58 0.73 
Mining 0.11 0.21 -0.15 0.26 
Plastics and Chemicals -0.06 0.12 -0.5 0.56 
Wood products -0.02 0.44 -0.35 0.64 
Textiles and Clothing 0.15 0.48 -0.11 0.65 
Machinery and  
Metals 0 0.35 -0.35 0.57 
Miscellaneous 0.19 0.47 -0.25 0.75 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
Table 9b. Market Price of Factors (% change) 
pm COMESA ECOWAS CEMAC Rest of Africa 
Land 0.38 0.68 -3.81 2.55 
Unskilled Labour 0.41 0.7 -0.04 1.06 
Skilled Labour 0.4 0.73 0.47 0.98 
Capital 0.38 0.55 0.49 0.91 
Natural Resources 0 -0.33 0.36 -1.45 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
  
Tables 10a and 10b display macroeconomic performance indicators for 
each region after AfCFTA. As shown in Table 10a, import and export volumes 
increase for all African regions due to an increase in trade flows resulting from 
decreased tariffs. Notably, CEMAC experiences nearly twice as large of an 
increase in imports than exports, which suggests the region has been 
predominantly importing from COMESA and ECOWAS as opposed to exporting. 
On the other hand, non-African countries experience slight decreases or no 
change in import and export volumes. Though the fluctuations are small, they are 
predominantly negative, which can be explained by a shift by African countries 
from trading with global partners to trading with other African countries due to 
lower tariffs. In Table 10b, it is revealed that while GDP increases for COMESA 
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 and ECOWAS, it decreases measurably for CEMAC, which can be attributed to a 
negative terms of trade for that region (as shown in table 9b). As terms of trade 
measures the ratio of export prices to import prices, it is a reliable predictor of 
changes in GDP. Higher export prices accompanied by lower import prices results 
in a gain in terms of trade. Since COMESA and ECOWAS experience a greater 
increase in export prices than in import prices, terms of trade rises in both regions. 
CEMAC experiences the opposite effect: a greater increase in import prices than 
export prices causes its terms of trade to decrease. All African regions experience 
considerable decreases in trade balance because the change in import volumes is 
greater than that of export volumes, with the exception of COMESA where there 
is a slight disparity. This can be attributed to import prices into the region being 
originally higher than export prices which offsets the larger percent change in 
export prices than import prices. Thus, increases in import volume would have 
more value than similar increases in export volume, decreasing trade balance. 
 
Table 10a. Import and Export Volumes (% change) 
 Import Volume (qiwreg) Export Volume (qxwreg) 
COMESA 1.51 1.62 
ECOWAS 1.99 1.58 
CEMAC 6.57 3.47 
Rest of Africa 1.91 1 
EU -0.03 0 
China -0.04 -0.01 
US -0.04 0.01 
Rest of the World -0.01 0 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
Table 10b. Other Macroeconomic Indicators after AfCFTA (% change) 
 
GDP 
(vdgp) 
Terms of 
trade (tot) 
Import Prices 
(piwreg) 
Export Prices 
(pxwreg) 
Trade balance (Millions 
of USD) (DTBAL) 
COMESA 0.09 0.07 0.15 0.94 -403.45 
ECOWAS 0.36 0.26 0.09 1.04 -440.77 
CEMAC -0.92 -0.27 0.27 0.24 -475.41 
Rest of 
Africa 0.78 0.44 0.09 1.33 -1345.62 
EU -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 855.54 
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 China -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 231.57 
US -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 811.67 
Rest of the 
World -0.02 0 -0.03 -0.05 766.47 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
  
A significant increase in intra-African free trade with the implementation 
of AfCFTA impacts industry output differently across sectors and regions, as 
shown in Table 11. While the other regional blocs experience mixed results, 
CEMAC’s industry output decreases in nearly all sectors. This can be explained 
by its smaller membership in comparison to the other regional blocs and the 
inclusion of less diversified economies such as the Republic of Congo and Chad, 
hindering the region’s relative efficiency in producing a variety of goods. This 
makes it more likely to import from the other two regions, as backed up by 
previous analysis of the data. However, the textiles and clothing sector (0.09%) as 
well as the machinery and metals sector (2.76%) face increases in industry output 
in CEMAC because those goods are more efficiently produced there. The textiles 
and clothing sector faces a net decline in industry output across Africa due to high 
tariffs being maintained on intra-African trade; moreover, production efforts may 
be increasingly diverted to other sectors due to drastic reductions in tariff rates. 
Industry output in the plastics and chemicals sector decreased considerably in 
CEMAC as it is replaced by production in COMESA (0.99%) and ECOWAS 
(5.56%), with large output increases in the latter. Other sectors face similarly 
mixed results. 
 
Table 11. Industry Output (% change) 
qo COMESA ECOWAS CEMAC Rest of Africa 
Animals -0.18 0.31 -2.71 0.34 
Crops 0.01 -0.02 -2.01 0.98 
Beverages and Tobacco -0.16 0.03 -1.16 0.81 
Mining -0.14 -0.3 -0.01 -0.78 
Plastics and Chemicals 0.99 5.56 -3.89 0.63 
Wood products 0.3 -0.35 -0.96 0.88 
Textiles and Clothing -0.27 -1.13 0.09 -1.73 
Machinery and Metals 0.5 0.19 2.76 0.57 
Miscellaneous -0.01 0.04 0.33 0.02 
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 Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
  
Table 12 shows the welfare effects of AfCFTA, which yield positive 
results across Africa. Total welfare increased in all African regional blocs, by a 
total of $2.78 billion across the continent: $126 million in COMESA, $589 
million in ECOWAS, $7.34 million in CEMAC, and $2.06 billion in the rest of 
Africa. CEMAC experiences a relatively smaller increase in welfare due to a 
substantial decline in terms of trade effect. This can be explained by the decline in 
terms of trade shown in Table 10b. Gains in allocative efficiency, particularly in 
ECOWAS, occur as more goods are produced by firms with a comparative 
advantage rather than inefficient, artificially protected domestic industries. This 
also lowers the prices of goods, ensuring more money is allocated towards 
investment and savings, contributing to total welfare. 
 
Table 12. Decomposition of Welfare (Millions of USD) 
 
Allocative 
Efficiency 
Terms of Trade 
Effect 
Investment and 
Savings 
Total Welfare 
(Millions of USD) 
1 COMESA 0.746 74.4 50.8 126 
2 ECOWAS 166 369 54.7 589 
3 CEMAC 0.333 -103 110 7.34 
4 Rest of 
Africa 462 1529 71.8 2062 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
6.2. Removal of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) - ams productivity shock 
Table 13a shows the percent change in the market price of commodities 
after the removal of NTBs. Market prices of commodities increased in all sectors 
and regions, while market prices of factors increased for nearly all sectors and 
regions. Unlike the different consequences triggered by a removal of tariffs in the 
first scenario, all regional blocs under consideration face similar non-tariff 
barriers, meaning the removal of these barriers leads to a similar uptick in prices 
across the continent. Removing NTBs increases the value of imported goods and 
decreases bureaucratic costs, driving up demand for imports, and thus prices. 
Many African countries that formerly imported goods from foreign countries shift 
to importing goods from other African countries as the costs of intra-African trade 
decrease. Table 13b shows that the price of labour (unskilled and skilled) 
increases across all African regions. As a productivity shock increases the value 
of each unit exported, the wages of labourers rise as demand for labour is derived 
from demand for the end product, which increases. The market price of land 
decreases by 1.13% in CEMAC, which can be explained by agricultural activities 
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 in that region being replaced by COMESA and ECOWAS, as established in the 
previous section. 
 
Table 13a. Market Price of Commodities (% change) 
pm COMESA ECOWAS CEMAC Rest of Africa 
Animals 1.43 0.97 0.68 1.09 
Crops 1.13 0.93 0.54 1.07 
Beverages and Tobacco 1.11 0.69 0.55 1.09 
Mining 0.37 0.6 0.37 0.4 
Plastics and Chemicals 0.35 0.33 0.54 0.71 
Wood Products 0.7 0.79 0.72 0.94 
Textiles and Clothing 1.16 0.8 0.72 0.97 
Machinery and Metals 0.62 0.63 0.61 0.77 
Miscellaneous 1.31 0.77 0.71 1.14 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
Table 13b. Market Price of Factors of Production 
pm COMESA ECOWAS CEMAC Rest of Africa 
Land 2.22 0.93 -1.13 1.7 
Unskilled Labour 2.18 1.1 1.1 1.63 
Skilled Labour 2.21 1.23 1.43 1.7 
Capital 1.96 0.92 1.34 1.52 
Natural Resources -1.9 0.39 -0.7 -1.17 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
Tables 14a and 14b depict data on trade flows and macroeconomic 
performance resulting from a removal of NTBs. Table 14a shows that import 
volumes and export volumes increased due to greater trade flows, brought about 
by removing physical and regulatory barriers that previously inhibited trade. 
Trade balance decreases for COMESA and ECOWAS while increasing for 
CEMAC. In this case, a greater increase in import volumes could have been 
outweighed by the rise in export prices, leading to an increase in trade balance. 
Table 14b displays the increase in GDP across African regions, which is larger in 
comparison to the first scenario. This can be attributed to a gain in terms of trade 
24
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 16 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 24
https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol16/iss1/24
 for each region. Removing NTBs decreases unnecessary costs and efficiency 
losses associated with transactions, increasing the real production content of each 
unit exported. This means that fewer exports are needed to import a given 
quantity of goods. Considering this, export prices increase more than import 
prices in all African regions, creating an increase in terms of trade.  
 
Table 14a. Trade Flows (% change) 
 
Import Volumes 
(qiwreg) Export Volumes (qxreg) 
Trade Balance (Millions of USD) 
(DTBAL) 
COMESA 3.13 2.01 -1726.83 
ECOWAS 1.94 1.11 -515.65 
CEMAC 3.25 2.11 131.15 
Rest of Africa 3.28 1.8 -2503.28 
EU -0.06 -0.02 1379.22 
China -0.08 -0.01 358.22 
US -0.09 -0.01 1509.82 
Rest of World -0.04 -0.01 1367.37 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
Table 14b. Macroeconomic Performance (% change) 
 GDP (vgdp) Terms of Trade (tot) Import Prices (piwreg) 
Export Prices 
(pxwreg) 
COMESA 1.88 0.76 0.07 0.84 
ECOWAS 1.04 0.62 0.03 0.65 
CEMAC 1.22 0.34 0.11 0.45 
Rest of Africa 1.46 0.62 0.04 0.66 
EU -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 
China -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 
US -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 
Rest of World -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
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 Similar to the results from a removal of 97% of tariffs, industry output 
shows varied results in COMESA and ECOWAS, while decreasing on net in 
CEMAC, as shown in Table 15. This can be explained by a diversion to more 
efficient producers as a result of lowered barriers to trade. Countries possessing 
more resources and larger economies are more likely to be more efficient 
producers. For example, CEMAC experiences a decrease in industry output in the 
animal sector (-0.45%) as demand is reallocated to COMESA (0.04%) and 
ECOWAS (0.15%). The same can be said of the machinery and metals industry, 
which diverts production away from ECOWAS (-1.41%), and into COMESA 
(0.55%) and CEMAC (2.48%). The mining industry shrinks in all African 
regions, which can be attributed to a demand for non-African imports. Similarly, 
the textiles and clothing industry shrinks across all regions. 
 
Table 15. Industry Output (% change) 
qo COMESA ECOWAS CEMAC Rest of Africa 
Animals 0.04 0.15 -0.45 0.03 
Crops 0.06 -0.09 -1.38 0.06 
Beverages and Tobacco 0.49 0.16 -0.06 0.35 
Mining -1.41 -0.18 -0.61 -0.89 
Plastics and Chemicals 1.33 2.34 -0.45 0.4 
Wood Products 0.5 -0.66 -0.84 0.03 
Textiles and Clothing -1.48 -0.9 -0.99 -2.09 
Machinery and Metals 0.55 -1.41 2.48 0.08 
Miscellaneous 0.27 0.26 0.32 0.24 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
  
Table 16 displays percentage changes in welfare and household income 
across regions. All African regions experience net positive results in total welfare. 
The overall welfare gains from a removal of NTBs are much larger than welfare 
gains resulting from a removal of 97% of tariffs. This is because NTBs play a 
larger role in hindering intra-African trade than tariffs. Removing NTBs results in 
lessened trade costs, border delays, and bureaucratic regulations, among other 
consequences. This increases intra-African trade significantly, creating large 
welfare gains across the continent. A majority of total welfare gains can be 
attributed to vast benefits to the technological component of welfare, generating 
welfare gains of over $8.5 billion across Africa. This can be attributed to a 
reduction in the “sand in the wheels” of trade, which enhances the value of 
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 imports. In contrast, non-African countries experience net losses in total welfare, 
especially in regard to the terms of trade component of welfare. This is likely the 
result of trade being diverted away from non-African countries to other African 
countries. 
 
 
Table 16. Decomposition of Welfare (Millions of USD) 
WELFARE 
Allocative 
Efficiency 
Technological 
Efficiency 
Terms of 
Trade 
Effect 
Investment 
and Savings 
Total Welfare 
(Millions of 
USD) 
1 COMESA 204 2675 930 515 4324 
2 ECOWAS 511 1486 889 133 3018 
3 CEMAC 198 607 156 -32.5 928 
4 Rest of 
Africa 754 3795 2156 91.8 6797 
5 EU -464 0 -1508 -101 -2073 
6 China -104 0 -603 -180 -887 
7 US -68.9 0 -764 -222 -1054 
8 Rest of 
World -37.6 0 -1272 -207 -1517 
Total 992 8563 -16.7 -3.42 9535 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
6.3. Removal of 97% Tariffs and NTBs 
The final scenario is the best illustration of the economic consequences of 
AfCFTA as it both simulates a removal of 97% of tariffs across goods, and a 
removal of NTBs. Tables 18a and 18b show the percentage change in the market 
prices of commodities and factors of production under AfCFTA. Prices in 
COMESA and ECOWAS increase across all sectors, whereas in CEMAC, prices 
increase in all sectors except for crops and beverages and tobacco. A slight 
decrease in the two sectors in CEMAC is due to a reallocation of demand to 
producers in COMESA and ECOWAS. In most sectors, commodity prices 
increase in all African regions. This can be explained by the rising demand for 
imports due to AfCFTA. 
 As shown in Table 18b, prices of skilled labour, unskilled labour and 
capital rise in all regions, due to an increase in wages and production. The price of 
land in CEMAC decreases greatly, and can be attributed to a higher demand for 
land in COMESA and ECOWAS. Given that CEMAC is primarily importing 
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 from COMESA and ECOWAS, the demand for land as a means of production 
decreases. Prices of natural resources decrease in all African regions; given the 
abundance in the supply of natural resources in Africa, a price drop is expected.  
 
Table 18a. Market Price of Commodities (% change) 
pm COMESA ECOWAS CEMAC Rest of Africa 
Animals 1.63 1.85 0.12 2.21 
Crops 1.16 1.78 -0.16 2.25 
Beverages and Tobacco 1.21 1.26 -0.02 2.15 
Mining 0.48 0.9 0.2 0.79 
Plastics and Chemicals 0.23 0.5 0.04 1.51 
Wood Products 0.65 1.44 0.41 1.87 
Textiles and Clothing 1.35 1.51 0.73 1.91 
Machinery and Metals 0.59 1.15 0.27 1.59 
Miscellaneous 1.55 1.46 0.53 2.23 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
Table 18b. Market Price of Factors 
pm COMESA ECOWAS CEMAC RestofAfrica 
Land 2.62 1.92 -5.91 5.34 
Unskilled Labour 2.71 2.14 1.25 3.18 
Skilled Labour 2.75 2.33 2.26 3.13 
Capital 2.47 1.73 2.2 2.84 
Natural Resources -1.92 -0.13 -0.58 -3.13 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
Tables 19a and 19b show changes in trade flows and macroeconomic 
performance after AfCFTA. Looking at Table 19a, import volumes and export 
volumes increased greatly because of reduced barriers to trade. A removal of 
NTBs tends to magnify the effects of trade liberalization, greatly increasing intra-
African trade flows. Import volumes for all regions were greater than export 
volumes, resulting in respective decreases in trade balance. CEMAC experienced 
a 12% increase in import volumes in contrast to a 6.76% increase in export 
volumes, and yet faced the smallest loss in trade balance out of the three regional 
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 blocs. The trade balance of non-African countries increased due to importing less 
goods from Africa.  
Other macroeconomic indicators are assessed in Table 19b. AfCFTA 
causes the GDP of all African regions to rise, while slightly declining in non-
African countries. This can be attributed to a net positive terms of trade in Africa, 
aside from a slight decrease in CEMAC. Overall GDP in Africa increases the 
most in this scenario, although the GDP of CEMAC increases more in the second 
scenario, where a removal of NTBs was modelled. This implies that CEMAC, 
with a considerably smaller combined GDP, is harmed by tariff liberalization 
while benefiting noticeably from a removal of NTBs. The percentage change in 
terms of trade can be understood by examining differences in changes of import 
and export prices. When export prices increase more than import prices, terms of 
trade tends to increase as fewer exports are required to purchase a given quantity 
of imports. COMESA and ECOWAS see export prices rising by around 1% 
(0.94% and 1.04% to be precise), more than the change in import prices, causing 
their respective terms of trade to increase. CEMAC, on the other hand, sees an 
increase in import prices (0.27%) that is slightly higher than the increase in export 
prices (0.24%), causing the terms of trade to slightly decrease. This small 
decrease does not have a significant effect on GDP, which increases nonetheless, 
but to a lesser extent than the other two regions.  
 
Table 19a. Trade Flows (% change) 
 
Import 
Volumes 
(qiwreg) 
Export Volumes 
(qxreg) 
Trade Balance (Millions of 
USD) 
(DTBAL) 
COMESA 5.27 4.39 -2284.84 
ECOWAS 4.91 3.49 -1184.23 
CEMAC 12 6.76 -483.57 
Rest of Africa 6.12 3.3 -4494.58 
EU -0.09 -0.02 2586.5 
China -0.14 -0.02 695.87 
US -0.14 0 2681.45 
Rest of the 
World -0.06 -0.01 2483.41 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
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 Table 19b. Other Macroeconomic Performance Indicators (% change) 
 GDP (vgdp) Terms of Trade (tot) Import Prices (piwreg) 
Export Prices 
(pxwreg) 
COMESA 1.96 0.79 0.15 0.94 
ECOWAS 1.56 0.96 0.09 1.04 
CEMAC 0.17 -0.03 0.27 0.24 
Rest of Africa 2.58 1.25 0.09 1.33 
EU -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 
China -0.09 -0.06 -0.01 -0.07 
US -0.09 -0.06 -0.01 -0.07 
Rest of World -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
Table 20 shows the percentage change in industry output across sectors 
and regions. Similar to previous scenarios, the results are mixed, but COMESA 
experiences decreases in output in most sectors. Where there are decreases in 
output in one region and increases in another region, production is being allocated 
to more efficient producers. In contrast to previous scenarios, output in certain 
sectors fluctuates by a greater amount (both negative and positive) under a 
combination of tariff liberalization and the removal of NTBs. Notable increases 
are in manufacturing sectors, specifically, the plastics and chemicals sector in 
ECOWAS (10.05%), and the machinery and metals sector in CEMAC (7.01%). 
Output decreases in the mining sectors of all regions, implying that an increase in 
production from tariff liberalization is outweighed by a decrease in production 
from NTB removals.  
 
Table 20. Industry Output 
qo COMESA ECOWAS CEMAC Rest of Africa 
Animals -0.35 0.65 -4.68 0.68 
Crops 0.03 -0.13 -3.87 1.36 
Beverages and Tobacco 0.3 0.17 -1.27 1.24 
Mining -1.59 -0.63 -0.8 -1.97 
Plastics and Chemicals 2.71 10.05 -5.66 1.02 
Wood Products 0.89 -1.22 -2.23 1.09 
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 Textiles and Clothing -1.79 -2.57 -1.02 -4.45 
Machinery and Metals 1.31 -0.95 7.01 0.98 
Miscellaneous 0.27 0.32 0.76 0.27 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
As observed in Table 21, welfare increases considerably across all African 
regions. The total gain in continental welfare resulting from AfCFTA is 
approximately $19 billion. The technological component of welfare accounts for a 
majority of welfare gains across regions, with values that remain constant from 
the second scenario, where a removal of NTBs was modeled. Aside from a small 
downturn in allocative efficiency in COMESA (-51.1%), all other welfare 
measures increased. An increase in investment and savings are a result of strong 
markets and growing businesses. As African economies grow, citizens’ incomes 
will rise accordingly whereas consumption habits may not change as quickly; as a 
result, citizens tend to invest remaining income in savings. Conversely, total 
welfare of non-African countries decreased overall, likely due to a diversion of 
trade towards African countries. 
 
Table 21. Decomposition of Welfare (Millions of USD) 
WELFARE 
Allocative 
Efficiency 
Technological 
Effect 
Terms of 
Trade Effect 
Investment and 
Savings 
Total 
Welfare 
1 COMESA -51.1 2975 932 571 4428 
2 ECOWAS 460 1799 1381 209 3849 
3 CEMAC 99.8 781 25.3 104 1010 
4 Rest of 
Africa 1132 4059 4344 210 9745 
5 EU -601 0 -2630 -160 -3390 
6 China -187 0 -1146 -255 -1588 
7 US -96.2 0 -1247 -388 -1732 
8 Rest of 
World 22.9 0 -1708 -297 -1982 
Total 779 9615 -48.8 -5.91 10339 
Source: Own aggregation of GTAP 9 
 
8.  Conclusion 
This study examined the economic effects of AfCFTA on different 
regional blocs in Africa, using the GTAP model. The results were largely positive 
for African regions, yielding  considerable increases in total welfare and 
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 household income. Of the three regional blocs, CEMAC benefits the least from 
the agreement, experiencing a decline in GDP from the implementation of a free 
trade zone. This can be explained by the smaller membership of the economic 
bloc and the inclusion of less diversified member nations, allowing it to be 
outcompeted by more efficient producers. CEMAC also faced smaller tariffs than 
COMESA and ECOWAS on its exports before AfCFTA, meaning it reaps the 
fewest gains from a removal of 97% of tariffs. In the third scenario, CEMAC’s 
GDP losses were offset by the more homogenous effects of removing NTBs on 
the three regional blocs. Furthermore, a majority of welfare gains resulted from 
considerable increases in the technological component of welfare; this is 
attributed solely to the ams shock which modeled the removal of NTBs. This 
analysis suggests that policy-makers should place emphasis on finding ways to 
reduce NTBs, as this contributes to a majority of welfare gains. The elimination of 
NTBs is shown to have a multiplicative effect on gains from trade liberalization. 
Other factors explored in this study, especially industry output, have shown varied 
results across sectors and regions; given this, policy-makers should base decisions 
by examining data from various indicators. Overall, AfCFTA has the potential to 
greatly increase standards of living across all African regions concerned by 
tapping into a vast market spanning the continent. 
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